Taiwan needs more than weapons to thwart China’s ambitions
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine represented a watershed moment for the West. It brought back the brutality, devastation, and the substantial operational costs of a large-scale conventional land war at the heart of the continent. It has also forced political leaders in Europe and beyond to face the reality that states – especially revisionist authoritarian regimes – can still consider war as an acceptable down payment to their aspirations.
Practitioners and expert observers alike are now engaged in a series of soul-searching exercises to understand what lessons this conflict may hold to better deter, and indeed prepare for, future wars elsewhere. With ties across the strait of Taiwan hostage to a militarily assertive Beijing retaining the option to use force to achieve reunification, observers have naturally turned their attention to China’s revisionist ambitions. The three days of wargames China conducted over the island has only increased anxieties.
It is crucial, however, to understand that the dynamics of today’s war in Ukraine are fundamentally different from the character of a potential risk of war over Taiwan tomorrow. Operational analysis of an unfolding continental war in Europe is not relevant to understand what capabilities are needed to counter a strategy to deter a maritime one in East Asia.
Crossing the strait is not equal to amassing 130,000 men across a land border. Indeed, in an invasion of Taiwan, strategic surprise would be incredibly hard to achieve and a large-scale amphibious assault would be fraught with risks. This does not mean that Beijing’s military threat to Taiwan is not to be taken seriously, but when combined with existing Chinese efforts to pressure the Taiwanese people to accept the ‘inevitable’ through coercion and interference, a different Ukrainian parallel comes to mind.
As the latest ‘encirclement’ rehearsal in the strait suggests, the Chinese strategy for Taiwan is more akin to that pursued by Russia through pressure and destabilisation prior to the Maidan Uprising and the subsequent limited military campaign for the illegal annexation of Crimea. In the maritime theatre around Taiwan, Beijing possesses options to elevate tensions and substantially increase pressure on the Taiwanese.
Blockading or overtaking any of the offshore islands under Taiwanese control, notably Pratas and Itu Aba islands, would present Taiwanese authorities and the international community with a challenging dilemma in terms of responses, not least because they lay far from Taiwan and would be very hard to defend. Vitally, it would give China a foothold on Taiwanese territory, not in the same way Putin had in Crimea – but of no less strategic significance to psychologically pressure the Taiwanese people and lend a hand to those who argue the inevitability of Taiwan’s reunification with China.
It would also help facilitate China's long-term political strategy. The main opposition party, the Kuomintang, holds a different stance about the future of Taiwan to the anti-Chinese mainstream. This past week, as Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen met with U.S. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy during a stopover visit in the United States, former President Ma Ying-jeou made a historic visit to China. There, he hinted that in a choice between ‘peace and war’ a different policy position is desirable. For China, boosting such political figures, seeking to sow political discontent that could be used to justify more direct action, is far more likely than a direct invasion. This is exactly what Russia did in Ukraine successfully for decades.
So what are the capabilities needed to deter war over Taiwan now? Intelligence aimed at unmasking Chinese interference and unveiling Beijing’s intent over the elevation of military action would be an ideal place to start. This, in turn, would enable the West to identify how to best support Taiwan in training against attempts at offshore islands overtakes and blockades, and procure adequate capabilities for mining, undersea surveillance, and submarine warfare in a contested air battle space.
In short: Taiwan today is in fact Ukraine in reverse. The core of our attention should not be on the capabilities needed to meet forces that have landed ashore. It should be on those needed to prevent a landing – even on offshore islands – from happening in the first place.
Alessio Patalano is Professor of War & Strategy in East Asia at the Centre for Grand Strategy, King's College London
